Institutional thinking tells us more about our approach to mapping the complex structures of reality than the processual, intricate, intractable and obdurate reality itself. Hence, 'categories and things may make it easier for us to grasp reality but they also hide its underlying complexities' (Cooper 2005 (Cooper : 1689 .
In this paper I examine the nature of theory construction from a processual approach. This implies a move away from emphasizing theory as an end product of a well-established method and a move away from emphasizing theory construction as a series of sequential steps. I argue that we need to take process seriously, not as one approach to research and theory-building, but as an ontological movement that provokes thinking to 'think beyond'. In order to do this, I draw upon Bergson's philosophical method of intuition and Heraclitus' way. Both these process writers pose significant challenges. As I shall subsequently argue, Bergson's intuition is a precise philosophical method. In the first line of the introduction to The Creative Mind, Bergson (2002: 11) states that 'what philosophy has lacked most of all is precision' and explains how his work has been dedicated to overcoming this problem. Hence, to understand Bergson's oeuvre as vague or imprecise is at best an overly simplistic representation of his philosophy. Our psychological understanding and use of 'intuition' as 'gut feeling' or an unthinking emotional response is partly to blame. However, our normative understanding of terms should not stand in the way of grappling with Bergson's sophisticated philosophical thought and recognizing that intuition, in the Bergsonian sense, is a precise method to deepen and enhance our understanding of reality as movement. In contrast, problems with understanding Heraclitus start with not having access to the only book he is supposed to have written. Hence, the fragments that are attributed to Heraclitus have been periodically disputed, re-ordered and re-translated. Heraclitus' way is deliberately paradoxical and complex. As Schur (1998) notes:
'Though we tend to think of writing as publication, not concealment, Heraclitus may have thought otherwise. From the fragments of his book that have survived, we can summarise that Heraclitus expected to be misunderstood. He may even have viewed obscurity and concealment as unavoidable consequences of writing.' (Schur 1998: 2) As with Bergson, to take Heraclitus seriously is to engage with his way of writing. As I shall subsequently argue, Heraclitus offers a generalised way of thinking that engages with movement and becoming.
In this paper I articulate an approach that emphasizes theory and theorybuilding as non-sequential, dynamic and creative. In order to do this, I argue that we need to effect a radical shift in our understanding of how process is generally construed. I begin by discussing how most accounts of theory and theory construction give primacy to categories and things and presuppose a detachment between the empirical reality and the abstract theory mediated by a rigorous scientific method. In contrast, I argue for a processual approach that puts us 'on the way to theory' by drawing upon the recent turn to process, relationality and 'withness' thinking (Chia 1996; Cooper 2005; Shotter 2006 ). The aim of this philosophical way is to provoke a deeper and enhanced understanding of reality.
Theory Construction
The discipline of management and organization studies does not aspire to be atheoretical. The need for theory is reflected in all the prestigious journals. Although the discipline is seen as an applied social science, the formation of journals like the Academy of Management Review specifically to focus on theory-building demonstrates its importance. As Sutton and Staw (1995) state:
'Perhaps people who are driven more by data than ideas are enticed to join an empirically based field such as organizational behavior. Perhaps the applied nature of the field attracts practical, no-nonsense types rather than the more dreamy misfits who might naturally be good at theoretical pursuits. If this is so, then the importance of training should become an even larger issue. Without constant pressure for theory building, the field would surely slide to its natural resting place in dust-bowl empiricism.' (Sutton and Staw 1995: 380) There have been several explicit debates on what constitutes theory and how theory is constructed. Special issues of Academy of Management Review (July 1989 , October 1989 , July 1990 , April 1991 , October 1999 ), Administrative Science Quarterly (1995 ), Organization Science (1995 and Organization (1998) have orchestrated debates on theory. These debates have focused on the nature of theory, the criteria for evaluating good theories, and the process of theory construction. In the main, there is agreement that a theory offers an explanation of why a logical connection between a chain of variables and events exists. Strong theories explain the underlying processes and the systematic reasons for the connections between particular occurrences or non-occurrences. ' It often burrows deeply into microprocesses, tying itself to broader social phenomena. It usually is laced with a set of convincing and logically interconnected arguments. It can have implications that we have not seen with our naked (or theoretically unassisted) eye. It may have implications that run counter to our common sense.' (Sutton and Staw 1995: 378) In recent years and as a consequence of the paradigm debates and the diversity of perspectives, there has been a move away from defining theory as explanation to theory as a political process (Calas and Smircich 1999) . Subsumed under the 'postmodern' label, these perspectives see theory as incorporating institutional, social and political issues. Postmodern writings 'represent a reflexive understanding of theorizing in organization studies as a political process rather than merely a neutral, truth-seeking operation' (Calas and Smircich 1999: 652) . Postmodern debates on theory raise questions about the nature of theory production, bringing into focus how different voices are represented and marginalized. Thus, a good postmodern theory pays attention to its political implications.
Theory as explanation and political process bring with them different dimensions that pose challenges for a theorist. In terms of explanation, Weick (1979) , drawing on Thorngate (1976) , argues that it is useful to think about theory as involving a trade-off between accuracy, generalizability and simplicity. He argues that, at most, theories achieve two of the three dimensions. These dimensions are apparent in variance and process theories (Mohr 1982) . A good variance theory can be evaluated in terms of the relationship between constructs and variables, and the boundaries that limit its application (Bacharach 1989) . It defines its limits by recognizing implicit assumptions and values that guide the theorist. A good variance theory also states any explicit assumptions that limit its generalizability. For example, a good organizational theory states whether it applies to all organizations across different time periods or is limited to certain time periods or types of organization. Once the limits have been recognized, a good theory generates constructs and variables in order to explain the relationships between them. A good process theory also demonstrates the trade-off in theory construction (Langley 1999). However, unlike variance theories, the trade-off can be seen by comparing the various 'sensemaking strategies' that are used to construct theories from process data. Langley (1999) argues that there are seven strategies used in process research -narrative, quantification, alternative templates, grounded theory, visual mapping, temporal bracketing and synthetic. Although these strategies are not mutually exclusive, Langley argues that they demonstrate the difficulty in meeting all the dimensions of a good theory. The three dimensions of a good theory, by definition, are incompatible. Hence, the trade-offs are not surprising. However, as Weick argues, they provide a framework for a debate about theory Nayak: On the Way to Theory and the possibility of conversations between academics in order to construct good theories.
A similar framework can also be used to debate the nature of a good postmodern theory (Weick 1999) . The dilemma essentially remains between three incompatible poles, but for postmodern theorists these are undecidability of meaning, the fallibility of representation, and the problematization of the subject and author. Weick (1999) speculates that 'a postmodern sensitivity may have just as many tradeoffs as does a modern sensitivity' (Weick 1999: 802) . A good postmodern theory is one that is reflexively aware of the undecidability of the meaning of the theory, the fallibility of what the theory represents, and claims to authorship of the theory. By exemplifying these three dimensions in the way theories are written, postmodern theorists engage with the political significance of theorizing. The implications of theory construction for postmodern theorists concern writing differently. Calas and Smircich (1999) argue that organizational researchers need to find alternative ways of presenting their research in order to incorporate multiple voices, open up the text to multiple readings and enable reflexivity in writing. Thus, incorporating the undecidability of meaning, fallibility of representation and problematization of the subject and author in the writing of research are seen as measures of good postmodern theorizing.
Although the 'linguistic turn' and its associated labels (postmodernism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, semiotics and discourse) have gained currency in organization studies, their implications for thinking are less well understood (Styhre 2002) . The common theme underlying the linguistic turn has been the importance given to the use of language and signs as a communicative act, which is not transparent. More specifically, these studies highlight the undecidability of meaning in communicative acts. Styhre argues that the undecidability of meaning has been dealt with in two ways:
'either we rethink concepts and put into question what concepts can be expected to represent, or we have to define more narrowly and specify what practices are to be denoted by a specific concept (i.e. provide ostensive definitions of concepts)'. (Styhre 2002: 462) However, rather than 'put into question what concepts can represent', it is possible to think about concepts as becoming (Deleuze 1990; Chia 1996; Linstead and Thanem 2007) . This implies departing from any claims of 'essence' in theories. Instead, theories are a way of intuiting becoming and 'thinking beyond'. In the next section I examine a processual approach which enables us to recast theory and theory construction.
Process Philosophy
'I am going to ask you to make a strenuous effort to put aside some of the artificial schema we interpose unknowingly between reality and us. What is required is that we should break with certain habits of thinking and perceiving that have become natural to us.' (Bergson 2002: 142) In order to articulate a processual approach, in this section I first outline an ontology of becoming realism, with its focus on introspective as opposed to external reality. Second, I argue that introspective reality is (1) undivided continuity, (2) imageless experience, (3) heterogeneous, (4) 'objective'.
Becoming Realism
Two distinctive sets of ontological assumptions can be discerned in order to demonstrate the differences between two styles of thinking. Chia (1996) draws a distinction between two modes of thought -downstream and upstream (Latour 1987 ) -and argues that mainstream organization studies are based on downstream thinking. Downstream thinking is predominantly occupied with what Chia labels 'thinking about organizations'. In contrast, Chia argues for upstream thinking in which the essence of organizational research is not thinking about organizations but 'organization of thought'.
The move from 'thinking about organizations' to 'organization of thought' encompasses a fundamental statement about reality which is too easily overlooked. Debates on reality move quickly to questions about objective or subjective reality before considering the question of 'what reality?' The statements 'reality is out there' and 'reality is in the mind' are all too familiar to anyone engaging in the ontological and epistemological issues. However, what gets overlooked is that reality in both these cases is external reality. Whether the tree exists or whether it is in the mind both refer to the external reality of the tree. This parallels the distinction between objective and subjective external reality in 'thinking about organizations'. If external reality about organizations is objective, then it is possible to achieve this through reducing measurement biases, triangulating data, etc. If external reality about organizations is subjective, then we have multiple perspectives on organizations that are dependent on the observer. However, Chia's move towards 'organization of thought' reverses the question of reality. Instead of asking whether external reality is objective or subjective, he raises the question of introspective reality. Hence, 'organization of thought' is concerned with the questions: What is the nature of introspective reality in its immediate, epistemologically unmediated and pure state? How does mediation through our sensory apparatus distort or colour our awareness of introspective reality? Are we aware of our 'inner states' immediately, or is our introspection stained by the admixtures unconsciously borrowed from our sensory experience?
To grasp the subtleties of introspective reality one needs to take into account its undivided as opposed to 'spatialized' continuity, 'lived' as opposed to 'represented' experience, 'qualitative' as opposed to 'quantitative' heterogeneity, and the 'objective' as opposed to 'subjective' nature of this reality.
Indivisible Continuity
The indivisible continuity of reality is illustrated by distinguishing between time as flux (not a sum of discrete units) and human consciousness as a stream (not a conglomeration of separate faculties or ideas). William James (1884: 6, 11, 16) coined the term 'stream of thought' to define experience of time in the mind. His descriptions of this 'vicious mode of mangling thought's stream', this 'illegitiNayak: On the Way to Theory mate' and 'pernicious' treatment of atoms of feeling, anticipates Bergson's characterizations of the spatial representation of time as a 'vice'. James distinguishes between the separate 'substantive parts' and the fluid 'transitive parts' (James 1890: 243) . For James 'every image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that surrounds it' (James 1884: 16) . Each mental event is linked with those before and after, near and remote, which act like a surrounding 'halo' or 'fringe'. There is no single pace for our mental life, which, 'like a bird's life, seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings'. The whole of it surges and slows, and different parts move along at different rates, touching upon one another like the eddies of a turbulent current. As James states:
'Consciousness does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as "chain" or "train" do not describe it fitly ... It is nothing joined; it flows. A "river" or a "stream" are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness.' (James 1890: 239) James and Bergson agree that consciousness is not an aggregation of discrete entities, but an ever-changing past and future that flows. Bergson articulates the continuity of time in terms of duration. Time as duration is fundamentally different from our common-sense articulation of time which is spatial. Bergson's critique of spatialized time is directed towards the tendency of contemporary thought, which represents time as on a clock. A quarter of an hour becomes the 90-degree arc of the circle that is traversed by the minute hand. This spatial representation of time is misleading. By distinguishing between experience and seeing the experience, we can think about time as a single indivisible act (duration) or spatially as represented by the distance traversed in sight. This distinction can be seen in Bergson's refutation of Zeno's 'proofs' that motion or change is impossible (Bergson 1913: 113-115; Chia 1998: 352-354) . Hence, it is not possible to discretize time without distorting its essentially indivisible continuity.
Imageless Experience
The indivisibility of duration points towards reality as always becoming. Hence, reality is not only indivisible, it is a never-to-be-completed process. It is always a fait accomplissant, not a fait accompli. This emphasizes the continuous creativity of reality. Consequently, it cannot be represented. Cooper articulates this unrepresentable nature of reality in terms of latency:
'To say that something is manifest means that it is clear, definitive and even obvious. To say something is latent means that it is unclear, indefinite and even nebulous. The latent does not easily lend itself to the clarity of definition; it is allusive rather than explicative. It can mean hidden, secret, clandestine; it can also mean lateral, widespread, disseminated, broad, extensive; it suggests something dormant, quiescent, virtual, waiting to be expressed, as well as something malleable, plastic and even formable. It seems to resist conceptual and practical appropriation, all the time receding from direct, explicit expression.' (Cooper 2005 (Cooper : 1693 In order to understand the non-representational, hidden and latent nature of reality, Bergson argues for intuition, which he defines as 'the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible' (Bergson 1955: 23-24) [emphasis added].
The difficulty in representing a becoming reality is imaginatively conveyed by the term 'imageless thought', inspired by James. Elaborating on the distinction between 'substantive parts' and 'transitive parts', James argues: ' Now it is very difficult, introspectively, to see the transitive parts for what they really are. If they are but flights to a conclusion, stopping them to look at them before the conclusion is reached is really annihilating them. Whilst if we wait till the conclusion be reached, it so exceeds them in vigor and stability that it quite eclipses and swallows them up in its glare. Let anyone try to cut a thought across in the middle and get a look at its section, and he will see how difficult the introspective observation of the transitive tracts is. The rush of the thought is so headlong that it almost always brings us up at the conclusion before we can arrest it. Or if our purpose is nimble enough and we do arrest it, it ceases forthwith to be itself.' (James 1890: 243-244) Although James's use of visual metaphors to represent the 'imageless' makes the ideas accessible, they can lead to misunderstanding reality which is unrepresentable. The use of 'stream' and 'places of flight' are visual metaphors and can give the impression that reality is representable. However, for James, as for Bergson and Cooper, the nature of reality is beyond representation.
Heterogeneous Reality
The continuous undivided becoming can be mistaken to be homogeneous. Consider Bergson's refutation of Zeno's paradox of movement. The emphasis on continuity may suggest that there are no successive phases and that everything blends into one homogeneous mass. However, reality is always heterogeneous. The absence of separation between successive states implied by continuity does not mean that there is no succession. Nor does it mean that the successive states are the same. There exists a qualitative difference between states. Bergson uses the example of experiencing a piece of music to illustrate how continuity and heterogeneity are complementary aspects of reality:
'A melody to which we listen with our eyes closed, heeding it alone, comes close to coinciding with this time which is the very fluidity of our inner life; but it still has too many qualities, too much definition (determination), and we must first efface the difference among the sounds, then do away with the distinctive features of sound itself, retaining of it only the continuation of what precedes into what follows and the uninterrupted transition, multiplicity without divisibility and succession without separation, in order finally to rediscover basic time. Such is immediately perceived duration, without which we would have no idea of time.' (Bergson 1965: 44-45) [emphasis added] 'Multiplicity without divisibility and succession without separation' conveys that reality, like a piece of music, is continuous, and at the same time, has a variety of notes, silences, and so on within it. Although it is possible to map the notes spatially, their indivisibility and multiplicity is the true reality. Bergson coins the term 'qualitative multiplicity' as opposed to 'arithmetical multiplicity' to demonstrate the difference between 'difference in degree' and 'difference in kind'. Qualitative multiplicity lies in the realm of the imageless and the continuous. Here the notion of the 'indivisible', stated earlier as part of continuity, comes into sharper focus. Although reality is indivisible in the sense stated Nayak: On the Way to Theory previously, the divisibility in question here is one of arithmetic divisibility, which lies in the realm of 'difference in degree'. The division does not change the quality of the thing, but the numerical quantity. Difference in kind, or qualitative multiplicity, lies outside space and representation. However, its difference, multiplicity or heterogeneity is revealed in the process of qualitative division (Bergson 1913; Deleuze 1991) .
'Objective' Reality
The distinction between quantitative and qualitative multiplicity reverses our understanding of subjective and objective. Our conventional understanding of objective implies that the reality of a thing is fully known and understood without distortion. Subjective implies that something is only partially known from the point of view of a subject. By reversing our understanding of the two, Bergson challenges conventional understanding. As Bergson states, ' we apply the term subjective to what seems to be completely and adequately known, and the term objective to that which is known in such a way that a constantly increasing number of new impressions could be substituted for the idea which we actually have of it'. (Bergson 1913: 83-84) In a footnote, Deleuze clarifies why we need to pay careful attention to Bergson's distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective'.
'Taken literally, these definitions are strange. By virtue of the context, one might even wish to reverse them. For is it not the objective (matter) that, being without virtuality, has a being similar to its "appearing" and finds itself therefore adequately known? And is it not the subjective that can always be divided into two parts of another nature, which it only contained virtually? We might be inclined to think it a printing error. But the terms Bergson uses are justified from another point of view. In the case of the subjective duration, the divisions are only valid insofar as they are effectuated, that is, actualized: "The parts of our duration are one with the successive moments of the act which divides it … and if our consciousness can only distinguish in a given interval a definite number of elementary acts, if it terminates the division at a given point, there also terminates the divisibility" (Bergson 1988: 206) .
1 It can therefore be said that, on each of its levels, the division adequately gives us the indivisible nature of the thing while, in the case of the objective matter, the division does not even need to be effectuated: We know in advance that it is possible without any change in the nature of the thing. In this sense, if it is true that the object contains nothing other than what we know, it nonetheless always contains more (Bergson 1988: 147) ; it is therefore not adequately known.' (Deleuze 1991: 123-124) .
'Objectivity' implies no virtuality and numerical divisibility. 'Subjectivity', however, implies virtuality and qualitative divisibility. It is the subjective that is real, imageless, continuous and heterogeneous (qualitative multiplicity) and it is the objective that is transparent, static, represented and numerically multiple. Thus, contrary to conventional understanding, it is the objective that is not fully known because it always contains 'more'. It is the subjective that is fully known because our experience (duration) is one with the act of dividing and the division terminates the divisibility.
Process philosophy, as the quote at the beginning of this section states, truly requires strenuous effort. What can one expect from a philosophy that places deep introspection as its central tenet! It does indeed take a concerted effort to think against our habitual grain of thought. Undivided continuity, imageless thought, heterogeneous reality and objectivity, all challenge and redefine what we take as given. We are used to thinking in terms of divisible space, and process philosophy asks us to think in terms of undivided continuity. We are used to thinking in terms of images, and process philosophy asks us to 'think' the imageless. We are used to thinking about continuity in terms of oneness or homogeneity. Process philosophy asks us to think about continuity as heterogeneous or multiplicity. We are used to thinking of reality as objective, and process philosophy reverses our understanding by asking us to think about objective as that which cannot be fully known. Process philosophy opens up a new world of inquiry that takes thinking 'beyond' itself. This move 'beyond' is predicated on a precise method.
Method of Intuition
'To think intuitively is to think in duration. Intelligence starts ordinarily from the immobile, and reconstructs movement as best it can with immobilities in juxtaposition. Intuition starts from movement, posits it, or rather perceives it as reality itself, and sees in immobility only an abstract moment, a snapshot taken by our mind, of a mobility. Intelligence ordinarily concerns itself with things, meaning by that, with the static, and makes of change an accident which is supposedly superadded. For intuition the essential is change: as for the thing, as intelligence understands it, it is a cutting which has been made out of the becoming and set up by our mind as a substitute for the whole.' (Bergson 2002: 34-35) The method of intuition is aimed at knowing our continuous, imageless, heterogeneous and 'objective' reality. 'The direct vision of the mind by the mind is the chief function of intuition' (Bergson 2002: 42) . Although our normative understanding of intuition is one of vague feeling or incommunicable experience, the method of intuition in the Bergsonian sense is the only method for understanding reality. Intuition as a method is not easy to understand. The task of intuition is to 'think beyond' by gaining 'intellectual sympathy' with lived experience that is movement. But again, 'intellectual sympathy' is not easily understandable. A first reading would suggest that intellectual sympathy is the ability to empathize, enabling us to think or feel as if we were someone or something else. However, a deeper reading suggests that, in order for it to be a general method, intellectual sympathy must be farther reaching than empathy if the reality that we are trying to access is one of movement. To think intuitively in the Bergsonian sense is to avoid thinking in terms of the immobile and think in duration.
Intuition as a method involves three distinct acts (Deleuze 1991) . First, intuition concerns the stating and creating of problems; second, the discovery of genuine differences in kind; third, the apprehension of duration. 'It is by showing how we move from one meaning to another and what the "fundamental meaning" is, that we are able to rediscover the simplicity of intuition as lived act, and thus answer the general methodological question (Deleuze 1991: 14) . Each of these acts poses significant challenges. The challenge in the first act is Nayak: On the Way to Theory 181 one of stating 'true' problems. 'True' problems are speculative problems which need to be invented and posited, and they are solved as soon as they are posited properly in philosophical terms. 'False problems' are ones where we assign true and false only in terms of ready-made solutions. By doing this '[w]e make the qualitative differences melt into the homogeneity of the space which subtends them' (Bergson 1983: 216) . Thus, it is difficult to stage and create problems. Staging or inventing a problem requires us to work against the ready-made in order to 'invent'. In terms of theory-building, we only concern ourselves with 'false' problems when we start with questions previously asked and empirical evidence found via a literature review. Hence, problems already exist and need to be uncovered and solved by the researcher. However, the question of finding and positing problems is more important than uncovering and solving them. Thus, the first step in the method of intuition is to 'invent' true problems.
'Inventing' problems is to get rid of false problems of two kinds: '"non-existent problems," defined as problems whose very terms contain a confusion of the "more" and the "less"; and "badly stated" questions, so defined because their terms represent badly analyzed composites' (Deleuze 1991: 17) . The 'nonexistent' problem arises when a hierarchical order is presupposed. For example, the existence of organization presupposes the existence of disorganization. Furthermore, organization is the negation of disorganization. The reason why this is a false problem is because it assumes homogeneous reality, whereas reality is fundamentally heterogeneous. The second false problem arises when a question is posed in terms of badly analysed composites. For example, the question 'how can we increase organization?' points to a dichotomy between the organized and the disorganized. However, since the two terms rely upon each other, that is, an increase in organization implies a decrease in disorganization, they cannot be two different things. The difference between them is one of degree and not of kind.
The second act of intuition is to rediscover the true differences in kind or articulations of the real. The issue here is to unhinge representations in order to return to the true nature of things. The way intuition moves thought 'beyond' representations is through dualisms. Moreover, thought can only move 'beyond' dualisms in the activity of their construction. These dualisms are not the outcome but a method of division that articulates differences in kind. Hence, the second task is to construct dualisms that divide representations into tendencies or becomings that reveal differences in kind.
The final act of intuition is to reveal the experience of duration. Intuition presupposes duration. For Bergson and Deleuze there are no differences in kind, apart from in duration. Hence, duration makes it possible to reveal differences in kind through the act of division. Deleuze illustrates this in the following way:
'Take a lump of sugar: It has a spatial configuration. But if we approach it from that angle, all we will ever grasp are differences in degree between the sugar and any other thing. But it also has a duration, a rhythm of duration, a way of being in time that is at least partially revealed in the process of its dissolving, and that shows how the sugar differs in kind not only from other things, but first and foremost from itself. This alteration, which is one with the essence or the substance of a thing, is what we grasp when we conceive of it in terms of Duration.' (Deleuze 1991: 31-32) Organization Studies 29 (02) What Deleuze, following Bergson's example of the dissolving sugar, demonstrates is that difference in kind is a difference of an object from itself. To understand this primary difference is to gain 'intellectual sympathy' with the object.
In the next section I examine the methodological implications of processual thinking and intuition for theory and theory-building. I argue that understanding reality through intuition implies that theories enable us to 'think beyond', which gets us on the way to theorizing.
Processual Theory Construction
The way [hodos] of writers, straight and crooked, is one and the same. The way up and the way down are one and the same.
(Heraclitus)
Our fixation with theory is accompanied by our emphasis on method. More specifically, it is the scientific method that underpins our attempts to construct generalizable and valid theories. In our conventional understanding, the method provides us with the right direction and a systematic approach. A processual approach inverts our conventional understanding. In order to appreciate a processual approach, it is instructive to note that the Greek word hodos gives us our modern-day word method. Hodos means 'way' or 'path' or 'journey'. It can also mean 'a manner; a course of action or speech. Combined with the prefix meta-, we get methodos, a 'following after, pursuit, esp. pursuit of knowledge, a method of inquiry' (Liddell et al. 1940 , quoted in Schur 1998 . Hence, our modern-day understanding of method, especially the scientific method, hides a more subtle and paradoxical understanding of hodos.
As the opening quote illustrates, for Heraclitus hodos is a way that is both straight and crooked at the same time. Schur (1998) argues that Heraclitus combines contradictory terms to demonstrate a paradoxical method by inverting our understanding of 'way' or 'path'. ' We commonly view [the usage of way or path] as metaphorical rather than literal; in rhetorical terms, the path is a picturesque topos (commonplace) and a vivid trope (figure), turning our attention toward something other than a real road.' (Schur 1998: 17) By inverting this commonsense understanding of 'way' and 'path', Heraclitus exposes us to his paradoxical method in three different ways. First, he inverts the 'way' of verbal expression, which is a topos, an expression of conventionality, something that is customary, captured by our everyday phrases 'of course' or 'that's the way of the world'. Hence, the way describes something that is familiar and methodical. By referring to the way as both straight and crooked, Heraclitus juxtaposes topos with a-topos which means out of place or strange or paradoxical. Second, he inverts the 'way' as a trope. Tropos means 'turn' and is related to the verbal 'way'. Tropos can mean 'turn' as in 'direction' or 'manner'. By juxtaposing straight and crooked, up and down, Heraclitus raises questions about the status of tropes. The Greek word poros (way) suggests the third Nayak: On the Way to Theory 183 paradoxical movement. The topos of the poros becomes an atopos (paradoxical) declaration of the aporia (waylessness). Although the three inversions of 'way' by Heraclitus may seem like a superficial manipulation of ancient words, it serves as an intimation to question our taken-for-granted 'way'. As Schur remarks: 'His [Heraclitus'] descriptions are provocative, challenging our reliance on the metaphor of the way by disturbing the commonplace notions of direction and correctness that it entails.' (Schur 1998: 20) There have been several notable efforts to articulate a processual approach in general (Chia and Holt 2006; Cooper 2005 Cooper , 2007 Linstead and Thanem 2007) and more specifically processual theory (Cooper 2001; Shotter 2006; Weick 1995) . Shotter (2006) , for example, distinguishes between 'withness-thinking' associated with relationally responsive understanding and 'aboutness-thinking' associated with representational-referential understanding in order to demonstrate the need for a processual approach that rethinks appropriate styles of empirical research. For Shotter 'aboutness-thinking':
'Besides requiring us to address the subject(s) of our inquiries as if we were disembodied, disinterested creatures able to adopt a God's eye view (Haraway 1991) -and to treat our subjects as if they were not subjects but objects -we also find ourselves committed to searching for something radically hidden … we seek a hidden, ideal, orderly state of affairs existing in reality, in itself, independently of any relations that we might have to it.' (Shotter 2006: 586-587) [original emphases] In contrast to 'aboutness-thinking', 'withness-thinking' aims to relate to the world-at-hand and become aware of the 'action guiding calls' that we need to 'go on' and deal with the world. Central to this approach is a move away from sequential, linear, discrete, isolatable and communicable bits of knowledge that can be additively accumulated to become a theory. A processual approach challenges atomistic thinking which sees management knowledge through the metaphor of mining, storing, coding and transferring (Goodall and Roberts 2003) and points to an originary difference that is ontologically prior to our mining, storing, coding and transferring understanding. As Cooper states: ' The work of process has no specific goal or end but is simply the regeneration of itself as pure action. An essential feature of this action is the double and reversible movement between negative and positive, nothing and something, absence and presence suggested in the archaeology of the word organ. Process here seems to be suspended in a primal condition of dynamic alternation.' (Cooper 2007:) The double movement of positive and negative, something and nothing, presence and absence, up and down, uncovering and concealing, truth and oblivion, articulate a processual approach.
Processual theory construction directs our attention towards the process of going about the task of theory construction. This moves the emphasis from evaluating the theory to the different stages in the process of being-on-the-way to theorizing. Weick (1995) argues that 'products of the theorizing process seldom emerge as full-blown theories, which means that most of what passes for theory in organizational studies consists of approximations' (Weick 1995: 385) . These approximations should not be dismissed because they do not adhere to the standards of a good theory. These approximations represent 'interim struggles Organization Studies 29 (02) in which people intentionally inch towards stronger theories' (Weick 1995: 385) . Weick argues that, given the interim approximations, we should think about theory as lying on a continuum from guesses to a strong theory:
'Many social scientists hesitate to claim they are writing theory … We would like writers to feel free to use theory whenever they are theorizing. Modesty is all very well, but leaning over too far backwards removes a good word from currency … Theory belongs to the family of words that includes guess, speculation, supposition, conjecture, proposition, hypothesis, conception, explanation, model … We plead only that they do not save theory to label ultimate triumph, but use it as well to label their interim struggles.' (Runkel and Runkel 1984: 129-130, quoted in Weick 1995: 386) [original emphases] Labelling the interim outcomes along the continuum as stages in the process of theorizing leads to the question of how the process unfolds.
Weick argues that theory construction in the social sciences is a difficult task due to the complexity of the social. This task is compounded by the role played by empirical testing of hypotheses which distances the hypotheses from its generation. Weick argues that it also leads theorists to construct trivial theories. 'Theorists often write trivial theories because their process of theory construction is hemmed in by methodological strictures that favor validation rather than usefulness (Lindbloom 1987: 512) ' (Weick 1989: 516) . The emphasis on validation through empirical testing de-emphasizes the importance of disciplined imagination and speculative thought in the process of theorizing. Thus, we need to describe the process of theorizing 'more explicitly, operate it more self-consciously, and decouple it from validation more deliberately' (Weick 1989: 516) . By focusing on the process of theorizing, Weick articulates some of the evaluative criteria used in the process rather than evaluating the theory itself.
Shifting the emphasis from the evaluative criteria for judging a good theory to the theorizing process reclaims the role of imagination in theorizing. It is commonplace to reject theories that do not proceed sequentially in order to solve a particular problem or answer a particular question. However, this grossly neglects that 'theorizing does not always originate in response to a problem (Ziman 1987) , and the single criterion of a solution is inadequate to cover other reasons why a conjecture might be selectively retained in theorizing (e.g. plausibility, coherence, elegance, simplicity, usefulness)'. (Weick 1989: 519) In order to bring into focus the imaginative process of theory construction, Weick likens it to an evolutionary process where variation, selection and retention play an important part in disciplining thought. The imaginative process, by definition, does not work sequentially and cannot be seen as directed by problems or questions. The problem-directed view of theory construction process demonstrates 'little appreciation of the often intuitive, blind, wasteful, serendipitous, creative quality of the process' (Weick 1989: 219) . Rather than validation through empirical data, Weick argues that the selection criterion used by theorists to retain conjectures is one of 'plausibility'. The 'plausibility' criterion implies several issues. Theorists ask whether the conjecture is interesting, obvious, connected, believable, beautiful or real in the context of the problem they are trying to solve.
Although Weick rightly directs our attention towards the non-sequential and creative aspects of theory construction, by only emphasizing the plausibility criterion he does not pay attention to the spaces between a theorist's attempts to achieve plausibility. What underlines 'plausibility' is the power of negation 'which translates it, a receding and vanishing image, which haunts, unperceived perhaps, in the mind of the [theorist] , which follows him like his shadow through the ins and outs of his thought' (Bergson 2002: 109) . Long before the theorist is able to affirm what s/he thinks, all s/he has to go on are the tentative errors and what s/he deals with are not outright rights and wrongs, but quiet murmurings that are more akin to the saying from the Upanishads, the Hindu texts -neti neti -not quite that, not quite that!' Hence, from the beginning the theorist is 'tuned in a negative key' (Heidegger 1968: 29) that powers his/her thinking towards 'thinking beyond'.
Interest, obviousness, connections, believability, beauty and reality underpinned by the power of negation ground the speculative flight of intuition. These define theories in the process of provoking, calling forth experimentation and going beyond established modes of thought. Theory, in this sense, is not abstraction but empirical. It is not generality, but preciseness. Theory is not about its object, but thinking beyond the object. The outcome of processual theory construction is not explanation. Nor is theory a way of writing that recognizes its constructed nature. Theory, in this sense, is not a process of moving towards a better representation of underlying realities. Processual theory is not; instead, it is pure creativity, always moving beyond itself. It is not, but it acts; it is not an atemporal and abstract representation of reality but the active or the useful or, more precisely, the creative. The notion of mobility, movement and change are the primordial qualities of processual theory.
Processual theory is by no means inherently insightful. Any more than conventional theories, processual theories cannot deliver simple conclusions or radical solutions. Developing processual theory, just like conventional theories, takes time and patience. Academics may not have the time and/or the patience to develop theories. Maybe the current state of research, particularly in the UK, due to a variety of institutional pressures demands speedy outputs. However, as stated earlier, management and organization studies do not aspire to be atheoretical. In comparison to conventional theory, constructing processual theory poses greater intellectual challenges, precisely because it aims to move beyond intellectual explanations and understanding and to illuminate the indivisible continuity, imageless experience, and heterogeneous and 'objective' reality. To think processually, to think beyond and to think creatively through disciplined imagination is a daunting task. The security of the readymade that is at his/her disposal from science, language, common sense and intelligence makes efforts towards processual thinking unnatural and extremely difficult. However, the method of intuition is precisely that which enables the development of processual theory. Without the method of intuition, it would not be possible to systematically engage in constructing such theories.
Conclusions and Implications
In this paper I have put forward the case for a non-sequential, imaginative process of theory construction based on process thinkers such as Heraclitus, Henri Bergson, William James and Robert Cooper. Despite conventional criticism that a processual approach leads to 'vague and hazy mixture of experiences which intrinsically defy clear and "strong" definition' (an argument raised by one of the reviewers of this paper), I have argued we need to take seriously the challenges this raises by reconceptualizing our understanding of 'theory' and 'method'. I have argued that philosophical intuition is the only method to gain access to a becoming reality, one that is continuous, imageless, heterogeneous and 'objective'. Understanding a becoming reality departs from conventional understandings of 'theory'. Conventional understanding of theory is defined by its conformity to what already exists. Process philosophy defines theory by its relation to what does not yet exist. Processual theory does not synthesize something that has been or that is. Instead, it announces what will be and provokes our attention to what is going to be. It is in this sense that processual theory is a way of 'thinking beyond' the human intellect and opening ourselves to the reality of movement and becoming.
To paraphrase Deleuze (1991: 116-117) , to continue the way of thinking inspired by Bergson, Heraclitus, Cooper and Chia means to constitute a metaphysical image of thought corresponding to the new lines, openings, traces, leaps, dynamisms discovered by a processual organization studies. In the final section I speculate on possible future direction of research in three organizational fields intimated by processual thinking. I emphasize a way towards organizing thought rather than specific end-points, hypotheses or findings.
Theory of the Firm
A central concern for the theory of the firm is the boundary between firms and markets. The direction of this debate, in recent years, has tended towards focusing on the making and unmaking of boundaries of firms and markets. As Langlois (2006) states in positing a modularity theory of the firm, we need to pay close attention to the mundane transaction costs that are part of 'the process of organizational change' (Langlois 2006 (Langlois : 1405 in order to understand the boundaries of firms and markets. By drawing attention to the mundane in the 'worldly' sense, Langlois points to the never-to-be-completed process of making firms and markets. Taking the direction of Langlois' inquiry further requires closer attention to the invisible transaction costs of organization. The vanishing hand is accompanied by an 'immanent' or, to use a suggestive phrase from Jullien (2004) , a 'lingering hand' which is 'all the more able to extend and deepen [itself] in the minds of their hearers for having not been definitively realized' (Jullien 2004: 67) . In other words, complementing mundane transaction costs and the vanishing hand are the muted relational costs and the 'lingering hand' which are not fully expressed, 'and so they retain something more for later deployment and keep something secret and virtual within' (Jullien 2004: 67) .
Creativity and Innovation
The connections between a processual approach with its emphasis on creativity and the organizational fields of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship are readily made. A processual inquiry privileges pure creativity over things such as Nayak: On the Way to Theory person, product or organization that is creative. The implications of this are, first, we need to move away from segmenting (spatializing) creativity and innovation. For example, segmenting creativity and innovation leads to theories that distinguish between different phases of innovation (idea generation, implementation, commercialization) and phases of creativity (preparation, incubation, illumination, verification) . Although the stages can be represented separately (spatially), they are durationally indivisible and heterogeneous movement. Creativity and innovation never is in any of the stages, but passes through them. The enduring dynamic continuity that joins and separates the various phases is neglected when different phases are emphasized. In other words, only when the final phase is completed do the previous stages become a part of creativity and innovation. Creativity and innovation addressed in this way may appear bland and does not tend towards spatial and representational novelty that we find amazing and impressive, but towards a sense of wonder (Heidegger 1994; Nayak forthcoming) . Processual creativity and innovation point towards blandness, which 'is the poetic quality that opens the way to this unceasing transformation' (Jullien 2004: 106) [original emphasis].
Organizational Change and Strategy Process
A becoming approach to organizational change and strategy process has gained prominence in recent years (Chia 1999; Tsoukas and Chia 2002; Carlsen 2006; Chia and Holt 2006) . Consistent with process philosophy, these contributions underline the importance of understanding change and process as continuous and recognizing that stable patterns, organization and identity are attempts to order, translate and author a becoming reality. Institutions, cultures and interpretive schemas are ways of prolonging the past in the present by arresting the 'intractable or obdurate into a form that is more amenable to functional deployment' (Chia 2000: 517) . These contributions draw on practice theories, ethnographic studies and 'thick descriptions' to show how 'practices mediate forms of cultural and historical determinations and display opportunities for agency and improvisation' (Carlsen 2006: 134) . In other words, these contributions recast organizational change and strategy in terms of absorbed coping with practices and understanding stability and identity as intimations of tendencies towards becoming. Continuing this line of thinking requires future research to take seriously tendencies, dispositions and propensities of objects (Jullien 1995) . In other words, practices not only display opportunities for agency and improvisation, they also have propensities and directionality and are always in the process of becoming.
